Power indices are commonly required to assign at least as much power to a player endowed with some given voting weight as to any player of the same game with smaller weight. This local monotonicity and a related global property however are frequently and for good reasons violated when indices take account of a priori unions amongst subsets of players (reflecting, e.g., ideological proximity). This paper introduces adaptations of the conventional monotonicity notions that are suitable for voting games with an exogenous coalition structure. A taxonomy of old and new monotonicity concepts is provided, and different coalitional versions of the Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power indices are compared accordingly.
Introduction
Power indices measure players' abilities to influence outcomes in voting situations. They are valuable instruments to study power -arguably the most important concept in political sciencebecause a player's voting power is generally not proportional to the voting weight at its source.
On the one hand, this observation is obvious from considering, say, a 50% majority rule applied to an institution with three players and respective weights of (a) 51, 44, and 5 percent or (b) 49, 44, and 7 percent: Even though players 2 and 3 have a non-negligible share of voting weight in (a), they are in fact powerless. In contrast, all three players face a perfectly symmetric need (and opportunity) to find at least one coalition partner in order to pass a proposal in (b), i.e., a priori they have the same voting power. On the other hand, the actual translation of weights into power typically is not as straightforward as in (a) or (b), where it seems common sense to describe the situation by power vectors (1, 0, 0) and ( Several alternative indices have been proposed as suitable mappings from weights and decision quota to power. The most widely used ones are the Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power indices (Penrose, 1946 , Banzhaf, 1965 , Coleman, 1971 ; Shapley and Shubik, 1954) , but there are many others. 1 In determining which of all these indices is most suitable in a given context, the respective axiomatic characterizations and probabilistic foundations play an important role. In addition, the monotonicity properties of a power index are commonly regarded as a major criterion. Some power indices will under certain circumstances indicate greater power for a player with a given voting weight than for another one who has greater weight. Other indices, in contrast, guarantee that any player endowed with voting weight w is identified as at least as powerful as any player who has a smaller weight w in the given voting game. This property is known as local monotonicity. A related property which refers to comparisons across games is known as global monotonicity. Though this may not be obvious at first sight, there are good reasons why some indices are not monotonic in one, the other, or either sense (see Napel, 2004a and 2004b) . This is true in particular when there exists information on the relations among players that is relevant for formation of a winning coalition (defined by jointly meeting the specified quota). Special relations among subsets of players can derive from their previous interaction, ideological proximity, geographic proximity, etc.
In this paper, we will specifically consider the case in which players' inclinations to form coalitions are captured by a so-called coalition structure: a partition of the set of players into pairwise disjoint a priori unions. This entails the assumption that either all members of any a priori union join a coalition, or none of them does. A priori unions can reflect the strict party discipline which is prevailing in many national legislatures and electoral bodies such as the German based on their shared political attitudes, but also as one between informal national a priori unions formed by the respective delegates from individual member states. There is scope for many more applied studies.
Since coalitional power indices which take a priori unions into account typically do not obey the conventional notion of local monotonicity, this property has naturally not played any role in discriminating between different coalitional power indices -let alone in their axiomatization. This is a main motivation for this paper. Its aim is to meaningfully extend local and global monotonicity to weighted majority games with a priori unions. It illustrates some distinguishing features of distinct coalitional power indices and clarifies their relation to traditional indices.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our notation, formally state the conventional notions of local and global monotonicity, and provide definitions of the most common power indices used for games with and without a given system of a priori unions. according to f .
The most important power indices are the Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index (hereafter BZ and SH index). These indices can be written as
where p and for the SH index
where s refers to the cardinality of S. An intuitively compelling property in the context of weighted majority games is local monotonicity:
holds for every pair of players i, j ∈ N such that w i ≥ w j .
Note that one might impose inequality (2) only for players i, j ∈ N such that w i > w j , i.e., not directly restricting power when w i = w j . This would result in an equivalent definition because 
If one such representation involves w
So it is not essential that we refer to players' weights by weak inequalities; it has the advantage, however, that an index's violation of monotonicity is exhibited by all weighted voting representations of a given simple game. Note also that local monotonicity automatically restricts an index to be symmetric.
The marginal contribution of a player i ∈ N weakly increases in weight w i : if player i ∈ S with weight w i can turn a losing coalition S into a winning one by joining, then any player j ∈ S with weight w j ≥ w i can necessarily do so, too. Moreover, the coefficients p While local monotonicity refers to the relation between power of two players in the same game, another intuitively desirable property looks at power of the same player in two different weighted majority games:
n is globally monotonic if for every two weighted
holds for every player i ∈ N such that w i ≥ w i and w j ≤ w j for all j = i.
Both BZ and SH indices satisfy global monotonicity (see Turnovec, 1998) . Turnovec (1998) proves, too, that any power index f which is globally monotonic and symmetric, is also locally monotonic.
5
We will next formalize an exogenous division of players N = {1, . . . , n} into a priori unions whose members will either join a coalition together or not at all. Denote by P(N ) the set of all partitions of N . An element P ∈ P(N ) is called a coalition structure or a system of unions of the set N . Whilst the two extreme coalition structures P n = {{1} , {2} , . . . , {n}} and P N = {{N }} do not discriminate between the players, all others introduce an asymmetry amongst them which is generally unrelated to voting weights. A weighted majority game with a coalition structure is a triplet (N, v, P ), where (N, v) ∈ W(N ) and P ∈ P(N ). The family of all weighted majority games with player set N and a coalition structure is denoted by W
induced by (N, v, P ) is the weighted majority game played between the unions, i.e.,
As in the case without an explicit coalition structure, we call two players i, into account, not only its marginal contributions. They therefore commonly fail to be symmetric in the conventional sense: players with equal weight may be assigned different power. We introduce two notions of symmetry which are better suited to games with a coalition structure:
each weighted majority game with a coalition structure
whenever the unions P k , P l ∈ P are symmetric.
Intuitively speaking, symmetry within unions guarantees that power differences for players in the same union must be based on differences in their weights (and not, e.g., different relations to other players inside or outside the union). Analogously, symmetry between unions formalizes that any difference in the aggregate power values of two a priori unions must be based on a difference in their respective total weights.
We will focus on three power indices defined on W P (N ): the Banzhaf-Owen index (hereafter BO index), the Symmetric Coalitional Banzhaf index (SCB index) and the Owen index (OW index). In analogy to Eq. (1), and letting player i be contained in a priori union P k , these indices can be written as
where P = {P 1 , . . . , P m } describes the coalition structure, M = {1, . . . , m} is P 's index set, and Q R = l∈R P l refers to the subset of players belonging to any union referred to by index subset R ⊆ M . The key difference to the standard evaluation of i's average marginal contribution (see Eq. (1)) is that a priori unions other than the union P k which contains i are assumed to have either joined with all their members or not at all.
For the BO index (Owen, 1982 ) the weighting coefficients p i R,T , which are usually interpreted as probabilities, 6 are
for the SCB index (Alonso-Meijide and Fiestras-Janeiro, 2002)
and for the OW index (Owen, 1977 )
where r, t, and p k refer to the cardinality of sets R, T , and P k , respectively.
It follows from these weights that one can view all three indices as describing a two-level decision making process. First, the respective p k members of the unions P k ∈ P take a decision amongst themselves -with influence on this decision measured using the probability model of either the with coalition structure P = {{1}, {2, 4, 5}, {3}}. 8 Ignoring the information about the a priori union of players 2, 4, and 5, one can compute the SH and BZ power indices as
and
This interpretation implicitly assumes i∈N g i (N, v, P ) ≤ v(N ), which does not generally hold if the (nonnormalized) BZ index is invoked within or between unions. The respective power values are weakly increasing in voting weights, which, of course, must be the case for locally monotonic indices such as f SH and f BZ . In contrast, the BO, SCB, and OW coalitional power indices, which take coalition structure P into account, yield
All clearly violate local monotonicity: w 2 > w 3 but each of the coalitional indices indicates greater power for player 3 than for player 2.
At an intuitive level, the a priori union between players 2, 4, and 5 means that feasible winning coalitions (or possible governments, in the political context that generated the example) never involve player 2 alone. Any spoils and policy influence which derive from a winning coalition will therefore have to be shared by player 2 with players 4 and 5. In contrast, player 3 (who is symmetric to player 2 ignoring P ) only negotiates on its own behalf and by definition always is the unique swing player in its own bottom-level subgame. So player 3 keeps an undivided full share of spoils from the winning coalition potentially formed at the top level. Knowing the coalition structure formalized by P , we should thus expect the respective power allocation to violate local monotonicity: indices g OW , g SCB , and g BO would have a problem if they did not (cf. Holler and Napel, 2004a and 2004b). Monotonicity concepts which take the behavioral constraints that are implied by a coalition structure into account therefore provide better benchmarks for the evaluation and comparison of these indices.
Local monotonicity and coalition structures
We will first consider adaptations of local monotonicity to weighted majority games with a system of a priori unions. The subsequent section will then address global monotonicity, and relate both notions of monotonicity to each other. In either case it is worthwhile to consider two separate monotonicity properties, within and between unions.
Local monotonicity within unions
Even when coalition formation in a given weighted majority game is restricted by a system of a priori unions, we would expect some kind of monotonicity at the 'very local' level, i.e., comparing players who belong to the same a priori union. This is naturally captured by 
holds for every pair of players i, j ∈ P k such that w i ≥w j with k ∈ M = {1, . . . , m}.
This property is weaker than conventional local monotonicity, 9 because it restricts power only for players i and j within the same union -not arbitrary pairs i, j ∈ N . If a coalitional power index satisfies local monotonicity then it also satisfies local monotonicity within unions. If it satisfies the latter but not the former, then examples of violations must, of course, involve coalition structures
Again note that the marginal contribution of player i ∈ P k to a given coalition, corresponding
, is not smaller than that of any player j ∈ P k with w j ≤ w i (i, j ∈ T ). Moreover, the coefficients p i R,T in Eq. (3) are identical for all i ∈ N in case of the three considered coalitional indices, respectively. We thus obtain
Proposition 1 The BO, SCB and OW indices satisfy local monotonicity within unions.

Local monotonicity between unions
An additional and complementing notion of local monotonicity in games with a coalition structure refers to cross-union comparisons. It relates the aggregate weights of unions P k and P l to their aggregate power values. It is natural to use simple summation for the aggregation of weights, and this is arguably the best way for the aggregation of individual power values, too. We then say that a coalitional power index satisfies local monotonicity between unions if total power of a union cannot exceed total power of another union with greater total weight. Or, more formally:
n is locally monotonic between unions if for each weighted majority game with a coalition structure
holds for every pair of a priori unions P k , P l ∈ P such that w(
9 Definition 1 refers to indices with domain W(N ) and therefore, technically speaking, the two monotonicity notions cannot be compared. We here and later implicitly refer to the straightforward extension of local and global monotonicity to domain W P (N ) (simply ignoring the given coalition structure). 
Considering our earlier example (N, v) =
In contrast, we obtain
for the SCB and OW indices, i.e., these are candidates for coalitional power indices that satisfy local monotonicity between unions. by an index which is locally monotonic between unions must involve coalition structures other than P n = {{1}, . . . , {n}}. One can relate local monotonicity between unions of a coalitional power index g to conventional local monotonicity of an underlying standard power index f (if it exists), provided that g treats the original game and its quotient game in a consistent fashion. In order to make this precise, we need to introduce two more concepts, namely the quotient game property (Winter, 1992) and coalitional extensions (Alonso-Meijide and Fiestras-Janeiro, 2002).
where (M, v P ) ∈ W(N ) is the quotient game induced by (N, v, P ) and P m = {{1}, . . . , {m}}.
This requires that total power of any a priori union P k in (N, v, P ) is equivalent to the power of player k (representative of union P k ) in the quotient game v P assuming the degenerate coalition 
The notion that a coalitional power index g derives from an underlying conventional power index can be made precise as follows:
In particular, the OW index is a coalitional extension of the SH index, and the BO and SCB indices are coalitional extensions of the BZ index. Combining the notion of a coalitional extension with the quotient game property, we obtain: 
where the first equality uses the quotient game property and the second that g extends f . So
if and only if
The latter and hence the former must be true for any pair of a priori unions P k , P l ∈ P such that w(P k ) = i∈P k w i ≥ w(P l ) = i∈P l w i whenever f is locally monotonic.
Corollary 1 The SCB and OW indices are locally monotonic between unions.
The corollary demonstrates that local monotonicity between unions does not imply conventional local monotonicity, which is violated by the SCB and OW indices (see p. 8). The reverse is not true either: the trivial index defined by g i (N, v, P ) = 1 for all i ∈ N is locally monotonic, but not locally monotonic between unions (consider, e.g., P = {{1}, {2, 3}}). However, if a coalitional power index g satisfies conventional local monotonicity and the quotient game property, then it is also locally monotonic between unions: g can be viewed as the coalitional extension of an index
This index is locally monotonic, and Prop. 2 can then be applied.
Global monotonicity and coalition structures
We now turn to global monotonicity, and show how above notions of local monotonicity within and between unions relate to their global analogues.
Global monotonicity within unions
Global monotonicity refers to the comparison of different games from a given player's perspective.
We will require that the considered games are comparable in a sense that accounts for the coalition structure. 
holds for every player i ∈ P k such that w i ≥ w i , w j ≤ w j for all j ∈ P k i, and w j = w j for all
This property is weaker than conventional global monotonicity because it restricts player i's power in (N, v, P ) and (N, v , P ) only when the weight of every player outside the a priori union P k , which contains i, is the same in both games. If a coalitional power index satisfies global monotonicity then it also satisfies global monotonicity within unions. We have 
And from j w j = j w j = 1 we get
Recalling that v(S) = 0 ⇐⇒ j∈S w j < q and v(S) = 1 ⇐⇒ j∈S w j ≥ q, Eq. (4) 
, and w h = w h for all h = i, j. Global monotonicity within unions implies
And, given that w i = w j , symmetry within unions implies
A (non-symmetric) index which is globally monotonic within unions but not locally monotonic within unions is, e.g., given by
(N, v, P ) for players i outside a given union P l ∈ P , whilst for every player i ∈ P l we have
j∈P l p j = 1, and p k = p j for some k, j ∈ P l .
Global monotonicity between unions
It remains to relate the aggregate power of a priori unions to their aggregate voting weights in different but (in order to be meaningful) closely related games:
for every two weighted majority games with the same coalition structure and quota, i.e., (N, v, P ) and
holds for every union
Intuitively, global monotonicity between unions requires that a union's aggregate power is (weakly) bigger in a game in which it has more aggregate weight than in one with less, provided that other unions' respective total weights have not increased.
The lack of local monotonicity between unions, identified earlier, already suggests that the BO index also violates global monotonicity between unions. For example, the games (N, v, P ) = 
In contrast to the within-unions case, global monotonicity between unions and conventional global monotonicity are two independent properties of a coalitional index. For example, the index defined by
is globally monotonic but violates global monotonicity between unions (consider, e.g., a weight
shift from the first player in P k to the others). Similarly the index given by
0 otherwise is globally monotonic between unions but violates conventional global monotonicity (increasing the weight of a union's smallest member can reduce its power).
As in the case of monotonicity within unions, the global version of monotonicity between unions implies the respective local property provided that the index under consideration satisfies an additional symmetry condition: 
Global monotonicity between unions implies
And, given that i∈P k w i = i∈P l w i , symmetry between unions implies
As for the local analogue, it is possible to relate global monotonicity between unions of a coalitional power index to conventional global monotonicity of an underlying standard index: 
for each P k ∈ P . For any game (N, v , P ) with the same coalition structure and quota, i.e.,
The latter and hence the former must be true if w(P k ) ≥ w (P k ) and w(P l ) ≤ w (P l ) for all l = k whenever f is globally monotonic.
Corollary 2 The SCB and OW indices are globally monotonic between unions.
The Proposition also implies that even though we have shown conventional global monotonicity and global monotonicity between unions to be independent properties, they are close cousins: if a coalitional power index g satisfies conventional global monotonicity and the quotient game property, then it is also globally monotonic between unions. Namely, g is a coalitional extension of an (artificial) index f defined by f (N, v) ≡ g(N, v, P n ), which inherits g's global monotonicity and to which Prop. 6 can be applied.
Concluding Remarks
Coalitional power indices which take a priori unions into account fundamentally differ from standard power indices as they can introduce an asymmetry among the players on top of the one created by differences in voting weights. Both types of asymmetry interact in a way that makes conventional notions of monotonicity -being merely a reflection of weight asymmetry -incomplete or even meaningless.
This paper adapted the conventional local and global monotonicity concepts to take account of a priori unions. First, we restricted power comparisons to players that differ in weight but belong to the same a priori union; only they are comparable in a straightforward sense. Second, we extended the notion of power monotonicity from individuals to groups of individuals. The former amounted to a comparison of power among players within a given union, the latter to comparisons between the a priori unions as actors themselves. The relationships identified in this paper between new and old concepts are illustrated in Figure 1 . Figure 1 : Taxonomy of monotonicity concepts for coalitional indices notions might be defined (e.g., relating players of distinct but still in some sense 'comparable' unions); we believe to have singled out the four most natural ones.
Our respective local monotonicity properties are as in the standard case implied by the related global monotonicity property in conjunction with a rather compelling symmetry requirement. One can, therefore, focus on inter-player or inter-union comparisons within the same game, i.e., local monotonicity. Amongst the two local concepts which we considered, within-union monotonicity failed to discriminate between the major coalitional indices -the Owen index, the Banzhaf The between-union version of local monotonicity does discriminate between the major coalitional indices, but it is a less straightforward requirement. It is not obvious why an a priori union considered in fn. 10 is not symmetric between unions but satisfies the quotient game property, and that g i (N, v, P ) ≡ max r∈M |P r |/|P k | for i ∈ P k is symmetric between unions but does not satisfy the quotient game property; hence these two attributes are independent.
with smaller weight should not wield more power in aggregate than one with greater weight: the respective numbers of members and internal weight distributions are possibly very different. One plausible argument is that unions with fewer members or ones with more concentrated weights are more influential because they suffer from fewer internal divisions. 12 In fact, the Banzhaf-Owen index tends, ceteris paribus, to indicate more power for smaller unions. It fails the 'between-unions' local monotonicity test, whilst the Owen and Symmetric Coalitional Banzhaf indices pass it.
So within-union monotonicity can be considered as a general adequacy criterion for coalitional power indices (assuming that all aspects relevant to players' interaction are captured by weights and coalition structure). In contrast, between-union monotonicity is a more divisive property, which is compelling to some but will seem artificial to others. The same can also be said of the quotient game property, introduced by Winter (1992) . Our analysis has identified it as being crucial for monotonicity between unions.
The multitude of indices proposed for games without a priori unions allows for an even bigger number of coalitional power indices. So there is ample scope for application of the monotonicity concepts proposed in this paper. Assessing whether the basic requirement of monotonicity within unions is met seems a good first test. Next, it is in our view worthwhile to distinguish indices that rule out effects of intra-union details (in particular, effects of a union's cardinality or its internal weight distribution) and that are hence monotonic between unions -and those that do not. Together with other adequacy requirements, such as efficiency or zero power for null players (with zero weight), monotonicity within and between unions can thus help to determine which of many possible indices is, in a given context, the most suitable one.
